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Abstract
We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications
of o¤ering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for tra¢ c on behalf
of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease
the networks incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare e¤ect of allowing
this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value
of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing
network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).
1 Introduction
The pricing of tra¢ c on the Internet is the subject of many controversies due to contrasting
views on how Internet service providers (ISPs), which manage the physical network, should
treat various types of content and on their relationship with content providers. In this paper,
we discuss the role of tra¢ c management methods that allow content providers to pay for the
data used by their customers. Examples of such methods include agreements such as AT&Ts
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Sponsored Data plan, Verizon FreeBee Data, and other zero-rating programs, whereby the
data generated by the consumers of a provider are not counted in the subscribers own
monthly data limits.1 Zero-rating plans are o¤ered not only in developed countries but also in
developing countries, through partnerships between large application developers and mobile
operators, such as the programs Free Basics by Facebook or Google Free Zone. These types
of agreements have raised concerns among net neutrality advocates and are the object of an
intense debate between Internet actors and regulators.2 The issue is whether discriminatory
agreements may be justied by e¢ ciency considerations.
To see how this problem di¤ers from standard discriminatory pricing problems, let us
begin by adopting a global perspective on the optimal pricing strategy for consumer content.
The Internet can be seen as a three-party business whereby content providers and consumers
use the network to trade. This trade creates some costs (mostly for the network) and some
benets both for consumers and content providers, either directly, such as when consumers
pay for usage, or indirectly, such as when the presence of consumers generates ad revenues.
When the presence of these consumers results in either costs or benets, it is natural for
content providers and the network to adjust their prices to deter or foster consumer usage.
However, two major factors impede such adjustment. First, many content providers are free
and thus cannot use prices to induce the behavior desired from consumers. Second, content
providers are likely to di¤er in terms not only of the cost they impose on the network but also
the benets they create. The combination of a missing pricefor content and heterogeneity
implies that benets and costs will not be internalized properly by consumers or the network,
which compromises the e¢ cient use of network capacity. In this work, we derive the networks
optimal pricing strategy when content providers di¤er in the social value they generate and
cannot directly a¤ect consumer behavior via price. We explore how network tari¤s that
target both consumers and content providers can be designed to alleviate the misallocation
problem of network capacity and promote e¢ cient network use.
Our main contribution is to show how ISPs can use zero-rating in order to screen contents
according to their willingness to pay for tra¢ c and to highlight two e¤ects related to the
two-sided nature of the market.3 First, as it is typical for two-sided markets, the ISP
internalizes the consumer surplus which reduces the potential adverse e¤ect on welfare of
content discrimination. Moreover, the benets from screening content providers is passed-
1See https://developer.att.com/sponsored-data for AT&Ts plan, and
https://www.5screensmedia.com/enterprise or https://www.sandvine.com/solutions/subscriber-
services/sponsored data.html for platforms intermediating such services.
2Regulators have declared zero rating to be anti-competitive in Canada, Chile, India, Norway, the Nether-
lands, and Slovenia. See the OECDs Digital Economy Outlook for 2015.
3In this paper we abstract from potential anti-trust issues.
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through to consumers to an extent that depends on demand elasticity and the intensity of
competition between bottleneck ISPs. Second, as some content is free, zero-rating plans may
substitute for missing prices by transmitting signals to consumers about the externalities
their tra¢ c induces, improving e¢ ciency. Indeed, the content providers choosing to pay to
participate to a zero-rating program are those deriving the highest value from increasing
tra¢ c. The data allowance proposed by the ISP may however increase or decrease the
consumption of lower value contents compared with a situation where zero-rating is banned.
While zero-rating plans improve welfare when they screen free content from paid content,
this may not be the case when they are used to screen similar types of content. The welfare
consequences then depend on the distribution of the value generated by the tra¢ c of di¤erent
types of contents.
The setup we consider is such that a network intermediates the tra¢ c between content
providers and consumers. Content providers receive a benet proportional to tra¢ c, such
as advertising revenue or direct utility for the producer. This benet is heterogenous, with
high-benet and low-benet content providers, but is their private information. Furthermore,
the total benets depend also on the usage level chosen by consumers. Because consumer
usage increases the networks total cost, a price can be charged to one or both of the parties
involved in tra¢ c generation. When only consumers are charged, we refer to one-sided
pricing, whereas when both consumers and content providers are charged, we refer to two-
sided pricing. We focus on the two-sided pricing case but demonstrate in the extension that
our insights apply also to the one-sided case. To match current practices, we assume that
consumers pay a tari¤ that depends on the data allowance they choose while the content
producers are charged a non-discriminatory linear price for the tra¢ c they generate.
We also allow the network to propose a sponsored dataplan to the content providers
whereby the tra¢ c to their content provider is removed from the consumer data allowance.
By relaxing the constraint on tra¢ c, this inuences the consumption choice and raises tra¢ c
and, therefore, the content providersrevenues. Given the networks option, each content
provider must trade o¤ the volume of consumption against the cost of tra¢ c. The high-
benet content providers will sponsor consumption to generate higher advertising revenues,
while low-benet providers will still be constrained by the data allowance. Such a zero-rating
plan thus enables the network to discriminate among various content types. These practices
emerge naturally as a correction for allocative ine¢ ciencies arising from the absence of some
prices (here, the price of content).
Absent the sponsored data program for the content providers, the network may decide
to exclude the low-value providers to extract more from the high-value providers. Allowing
zero-rating alleviates this standard monopoly trade-o¤. Providers have the option to increase
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consumption by paying for tra¢ c, which allows the network to di¤erentiate consumption by
content type. Despite improving e¢ ciency compared with uniform tari¤, the menu of prices
results in socially suboptimal consumption levels. Indeed, the network reduces consumption
levels for contents that do not choose to pay for tra¢ c in order to raise the relative value
and thus the price of sponsored data.
When zero-rating is not allowed, the network cannot extract the rent from the high-
benet content without excluding the low-benet content. It follows that there will be more
exclusion under uniform tari¤ than under zero-rating. Absent exclusion with uniform price,
the welfare consequences of banning this discrimination are ambiguous due to the opposite
e¤ects on the two types of content. We show that a ban on zero-rating reduces welfare if
the proportion of low-benet content is large, but it raises welfare if the value of low-benet
content is not too low.
We extend the analysis in several directions. First, we consider the case of one-sided
pricing. Sponsored data generates higher incremental value for adopters of the plan than un-
der two-sided pricing, whereas the consumption under data allowance decreases. The welfare
analysis is similar, but there cannot be exclusion of any content in this case.
Second, we discuss the case of elastic demand and competing networks. We show that
competing networks will choose to propose the same sponsored data program as in the
benchmark case, as each network still wants to maximize the value generated per consumer.
We also show that elastic consumer participation argues for less regulation because the
network will pass on to consumers a larger share of the gains obtained from content providers.
Third, we discuss a more general model that accommodates content providers di¤ering
in terms of demand, advertising benets and tra¢ c intensity. We show that the analysis
extends to this case and that what matters for the adoption of sponsored data is the content
providersbenet per unit of tra¢ c generated.
Finally, we extend the analysis to the more general case in which content can be either
free or paid. In this extended setting, the network has still some incentives to propose a
sponsored data program. And this program allows to increase global e¢ ciency.
Our work is rst related to the literature on two-sided markets (see Caillaud and Jullien,
2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006), in that we aim to characterize the
optimal pricing for each side of the market, content providers and consumers. We combine
the participation model of Armstrong (2006) and the usage model of Rochet and Tirole
(2003). In our basic model, the total number of agents on the consumer side is xed and
their consumption is a¤ected only by the price and number  or more precisely the types 
of content providers in the market. On the content-provider side, prot depends not only on
the network charges providers must pay but also on the number of consumers and the data
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allowance. The number of content providers can vary, in part because low-benet providers
may be priced out of the market by network charges.
Some contributions in the eld of telecommunications have studied the senderreceiver
pricing structure. This literature emphasizes the importance of call externalities" and,
hence, the social benets associated with using positive receiver prices (Jeon, La¤ont and
Tirole, 2004). Hermalin and Katz (2004) develop a related idea while focusing on how best to
address uncertainty over the private value of exchanging messages, and the game  namely
the choice to call or to wait for a call  induced by the tari¤ structure. In our paper, the
structure of communication is di¤erent because it is the receiver (i.e., the consumer) who
always initiates the communication. Another di¤erence is that, in our setup, only the sender
learns the true benet of this communication.
The literature on the Internet price regulation has been driven by the debate over net neu-
trality and the optimal way to price content providers and consumers (see, e.g., Economides
and Hermalin, 2012, and Greenstein, Peitz and Valletti, 2016). One point emerging from
two-sided market models is that, although laissez-faire can be shown to result in ine¢ cient
pricing, the precise nature of an intervention that would foster e¢ ciency is unclear (Econo-
mides and Tåg, 2012). While neglecting the investment question (on this point, see, e.g.,
Choi and Kim, 2010; Hermalin and Katz, 2009), we direct our attention to the e¢ cient man-
agement of current resources when the benet of consumption is uncertain. Several recent
contributions discuss the screening of congestion sensitive content by means of prices and dif-
ferentiated quality layers, a key aspect of the net neutrality debate (Krämer and Wiewiorra,
2012; Reggiani and Valletti, 2016; Choi, Jeon and Kim, 2015; Bourreau, Kourandi and
Valletti, 2015). Peitz and Schuett (2016) analyze moral hazard in tra¢ c generation using
a model that incorporates congestion externalities. At last, Somogyi (2017) proposes an
analysis of zero-rating with a particular focus on congestion but in a setting where some
contents cannot have access to zero-rating o¤ers and exogenous consumersprices.
Our work departs from these papers by considering consumption usage and the allocative
role of consumer prices. A specic contribution is to show when zero-rating induces screening
among tra¢ c-sensitive content types and enhances e¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After describing the model in Section 2,
we analyze in Section 3 the outcome under uniform pricing and under zero-rating, and we
discuss the consequences of welfare consequence of banning zero-rating. In Section 4, we
explore the extensions mentioned above. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model
2.1 Framework
We analyze the tari¤ charged for tra¢ c by a network (an ISP, in the case of the Internet)
to two sides of the market: a unit mass of consumers and a unit mass of content providers.
In practice, some content is delivered freely to consumers while other content is paid for. To
focus on our papers novel aspects, we simplify the analysis by assuming in the core of the
paper that all content is free and consider the possibility of paid content in the extension
section. Moreover, contents are non-competing and consumers visit all content providers.
Consumers are homogenous with utility function u(q), strictly concave on [0; q] such that
u0 (0) = p > 0 and u0 (q) = 0. Alternatively, we can consider the demand for each con-
tent when consumers bear a cost p per unit of content by q = D(p), with D() = u0 1 ()
decreasing, reaching a maximum at D (0) = q and such that D(p) = 0.
Transactions between content providers and consumers generate costs and benets in
addition to the utility consumers derive from usage. More precisely, each unit of content
generates a cost of tra¢ c , born by the network, that we normalize to  = 1: This cost
may be a short-run operating cost or the long-run networks costs of expending resources to
maintain service quality. We assume that consumption is positive if the consumer bears the
full cost of tra¢ c, i.e. 1 < p. Furthermore, each unit of consumption generates a benet b > 0
for the content providers, net of the cost (if any) of distributing the content. This benet is
diverse, including the advertising revenue4 and other gains for the content providers such as
private benets for blogs and not-for-prot organizations, the value of consumer data and
the leverage of the customer base on the capital market. Content providers are heterogenous
and can be of either low-benet (LB) type `, with benets b`, or high-benet (HB) type h,
that is with benets bh.5 A content is of type h with probability  and of type ` with
probability 1 . We assume that if content providers had to pay the full cost of tra¢ c only
HB content would be protable :
b` < 1 < bh:
As a consequence, LB content providers will not operate unless consumers pay for part
of the tra¢ c cost.
It is assumed that the network cannot distinguish between the di¤erent types of content
consumed; in other words, it is not allowed to practice explicit discrimination. The network
4Advertising revenue increases with consumption if the consumer time devoted to a page is increasing in
consumption or if advertising is tied to consumption in some other ways.
5In the extension section, we will allow consumer utility and cost of tra¢ c to depend on the content
provider type.
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proposes to consumers a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er consisting of a data allowance T , that is, a
maximal level of tra¢ c consumption, at a price P .6 On the other side of the market, we
assume that the network charges a linear price s  0 for the tra¢ c generated by content, so
that each content providers cost of servicing a quantity q to a consumer is sq. We also allow
the network to o¤er sponsored data programs to content providers. This takes the form of
an option removing the consumerstra¢ c from their data allowance T ,7 in exchange for a
payment S made by the content provider to the network.8 As the sponsored consumption is
free of charge, it is predictable and equal to the maximal demand q dened above.
We consider the following timing:
1. The network proposes the data allowance T and prices P and s; as well as S if zero-
rating is allowed.
2. Each content provider decides whether to be active and may also choose the sponsored
data option, if available.
3. Each consumer decides whether to subscribe and then determines how to allocate the
data allowance among contents.
4. Tra¢ c is observed, and payments are made to the network.
For the main part of the paper, we focus on the case of a monopoly network with inelastic
participation by consumers. Let us denote by CS the gross consumer surplus from usage.
It is given by CS = u (qh) + (1  )u (q`) ; where qh and q` represent the consumption of
HB and LB content, respectively. Because consumers are ex ante identical, the network can
extract the full surplus by requiring a total payment P equal to the gross consumer surplus,
i.e. P = CS: Accordingly, the networks objective fully internalizes the consumer surplus.
Let  denote the di¤erence between the networks total revenue derived from content
providers and the total cost of supporting the tra¢ c. We dene the network value as V =
CS+: Given that P = CS; the networks prot is equal to the network value. Therefore it
is optimal for the network to choose values of T , s and S that maximize V which we assume
from now on.9
6Assuming a single o¤er (T; P ) is without loss of generality. As consumers are homogenous and anticipate
perfectly their tra¢ c, we could allow for a non-linear tari¤ P (T ) without altering the analysis.
7For an analysis of data caps by ISPs and mobile operators, see Economides and Hermalin (2015).
8Notice that due to consumers ex-ante homogeneity, the ISP would not introduce zero-rating unless it is
paid by content providers.
9We will show that network behavior leads to V also being maximized with competition between networks
or elastic demand, although V does not coincide with total network prots in these cases.
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As a benchmark, let us consider the socially optimal allocation with full information on
the content type. This scenario corresponds to the case of a regulated network maximizing
social welfare and perfectly discriminating between content types. Content with benet b
generates social welfare of u(q) + (b   1)q . Then social welfare is maximal at qFBt , with
t = `; h, solution of
u0
 
qFBt

= max f1  bt; 0g ; t 2 f`; hg:
When the content price for a type-t content is discriminatory and equal to st = bt, the
content provider receives zero surplus. Hence, for st = bt; the network value for each type-
t content Vt = u (qt)   qt + btqt is equal to the total welfare. This implies that a network
maximizing V implements the social optimum under perfect price discrimination with respect
to content.
3 Uniform tari¤ vs zero-rating o¤ers
We now investigate the networks choice of tari¤s, and the impact of regulating networks
pricing strategy.
3.1 Uniform tari¤
We rst consider the case in which all tra¢ c is included in the data allowance and all content
providers face the same pricing conditions for accessing the network. Under uniform tari¤ a
content providers only decision is whether to participate or not. Because content providers
do not charge consumers for the good or service they o¤er, their prots can only be generated
via the benet per unit of tra¢ c b. The price s charged by the network to them cannot
be passed through to consumers. Therefore, given a price s, a content provider of type t
stays in the market if it anticipates a nonnegative prot  that is, if s  bt for t = `; h. In
particular, if s lies between b` and bh, then only the HB content providers participate in the
market, while all content providers participate if s is below b`:
Let us denote byM 2 f; 1g the mass of active content providers. With a data allowance
T , and the same utility for every content, consumers will consume the same quantity of
each content q = T=M: For given content participation (so for given M), choosing a data
allowance amounts to choosing the consumption q of each content. Consumers net surplus
is Mu (q) P: As the network can capture the full consumer surplus, the consumption level
q is chosen to maximize the network value V = Mu (q) +M(s   1)q. This leads to q such
that u0(q) = 1   s if s < 1 or q = q si s  1. Framed di¤erently, if the network chooses a
price s  b` that allows all types of contents to be protable, then the data allowance is such
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that u0(T ) = 1   s: On the other hand, if the price s is greater than 1 (and less than bh),
only HB content providers will be on the network and the data allowance given by T = q:
Therefore, the network chooses s by comparing two possible prices for content: the
maximal price s = b` that maintains full participation of the content and the maximal price
s = bh that preserves the participation of only HB content providers. The consumption
levels in these two cases are respectively qFB` , such that u
0(qFB` ) = 1   b`, and q: These two
strategies yield the following network values:
V u` = u
 
qFB`

+ (b`   1) qFB` when s = b`
V uh =  [u (q) + (bh   1) q] when s = bh:
When the network chooses a price s to make both types of content providers participate,
a strictly positive prot must be left to HB content providers because one cannot di¤erentiate
between contents. The network will instead choose to increase its price, and thereby keep
only the HB content, when the proportion of this content is large.
Proposition 1 Under uniform pricing, the network excludes the LB content by choosing a
high price su = bh if and only if  > 
u: The threshold u is decreasing in bh and increasing
in b`:
Proof. See Appendix.
The prot that the network obtains per unit of content is thus equal to the total value
generated by the marginal content provider. The induced consumption is e¢ cient for the
marginal content and suboptimal for inframarginal content. As a consequence there is
excessive exclusion.
3.2 Zero-rating
When choosing price s, the network faces the standard monopoly trade-o¤between capturing
the rent of HB content providers (with high s) and avoiding the exclusion of LB content
providers (with low s). One way to alleviate this trade-o¤ consists in relying on a zero-
rating policy to implement more complex tari¤s. Therefore, we allow the network to o¤er a
sponsored data option. With this option, a content provider pays a xed fee S in order to
remove its tra¢ c from consumersdata allowance.
With the sponsored data option, consumers can adjust their consumption for each type
of content. If the consumption of one type of content is removed from the data allowance,
consumers will consume q of this content. If the network succeeds at inducing the LB and
9
the HB content providers to choose di¤erent options, then it is immediate that the HB
content providers choose to sponsor data. Therefore, the data allowance only concerns the
LB content. The LB content consumption, denoted q`; is then given by q` = T= (1  ).
We dene the pricing under zero-rating as a set of price fs; Sg and a data allowance level
T such that
 the LB and HB content providers are willing to participate, and
 the LB content providers choose not to sponsor the tra¢ c, while the HB content
providers choose to sponsor the tra¢ c and pay the additional fee S.
We assume that the network o¤ers a zero-rating program only if this allows to strictly
increase its prots. We now detail how this program should be optimally structured to
maximize the networksprot.
Under zero-rating, consumers are constrained by the data allowance for one type of
content only and obtain the gross surplus u (q) + (1  )u (q`). As the network captures
this surplus through the price P; the network value is then equal to
V =  [u (q) + (s  1)q + S] + (1  ) [u (q`) + (s  1)q`] :
The tari¤ induces participation of both HB and LB provider types as long as
b`  s and bhq  sq + S: (1)
The following incentive compatibility conditions ensure that each content provider chooses
the tari¤ designed for its specic type:
(b`   s) q`  (b`   s) q   S
(bh   s) q   S  (bh   s) q`
(2)
The rst condition states that a LB content providers do not gain by paying S to boost
the tra¢ c to q: To interpret the second equation, we remind that all contents are perceived
as equivalent by consumers. Hence, if some HB content providers choose not to sponsor the
tra¢ c, each consumer allocates her consumption uniformly across all non-sponsored contents.
As content providers are non-atomistic, a single HB content provider deviating by refusing
to take the option would face the same consumption q` as LB content providers.
Sponsored tari¤s are thus equivalently characterized by an allocation (q`; s; S) such that
conditions (1) and (2) are satised. The networks program is then to maximize V under
these constraints.
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Let us rst x the data allowance T (hence q`) and discuss the choice of tari¤s s and
S: First, since it is optimal to raise content prices as long as they remain compatible with
the constraints, the participation constraint of the LB content providers and the incentive
compatibility constraint of the HB content providers will be binding, so
s = b` and S = (bh   b`) (q   q`) : (3)
Under conditions (3), the remaining constraints are satised because q`  q. Hence, the
optimal prices are given by (3) and we obtain the following reduced program:
max
q`0
 [u (q)  (1  bh)q   (bh   b`)q`] + (1  ) [u (q`)  (1  b`)q`] :
This expression leads directly to the following statement.
Proposition 2 The network o¤ers a sponsored data option if and only if 1  b` + 1 (bh  
b`) < p: In this case the tari¤s and data allowance are given by
u0 (q` ) = 1  b` +

1  (bh   b`); s
 = b`; S = (bh   b`) (q   q` ) ;
where q` = T
= (1  ) :
Otherwise, the network sets s = bh with T   q; and doesnt o¤er the sponsored data
option.
Proof. The solution of the reduced program is obtained at
u0 (q`) = 1  b` + 
1  (bh   b`) if it is less than p
q` = 0 otherwise
When q` > 0; the prices s and S are then given by condition (3).
When q` = 0; the conditions lead to S+sq = bhq which induces the same level of prot as
a single price s = bh: Hence, the network doesnt o¤er a contingent plan and simply choose
a data allowance for e¢ cient consumption of HB content.
The menu of tari¤s proposed by the network plays two roles. It allows the network to
screen the di¤erent types of content providers, and it leads to more e¢ cient consumption.
HB content providers prefer high consumption and choose the option that removes it from
the consumer data allowance. Because the benet bh is larger than the cost of tra¢ c, equal
to 1; this induces an e¢ cient consumption level of the HB content. The total price paid
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by the HB content providers is strictly less than the total benet bhq; because the network
must forego some prot to induce the HB content providers to choose the sponsored data
option. Whereas the price s is simply set to capture the LB content providers benets
surplus, the data allowance chosen is a¤ected by two factors. First, it reects the net cost
1   b` of any unit of tra¢ c. Second, relative to e¢ cient consumption at this net cost, it is
distorted downward in order to deter the HB content providers from choosing the normal
o¤er. Indeed, reducing T makes the sponsored data option relatively more attractive and
allows the network raising S.10
In this setting, the network may decide to exclude the LB content providers, by choosing
T = 0 or alternatively s = bh without zero-rating. This is the case when the quantity q`
resulting from the price characterized in Proposition 2 is negative  and thus when  is
large:
q` = 0()    = p  (1  b`)
p  (1  bh) : (4)
In this case, the network does not need to rely on zero-rating and may simply o¤er a
linear price to content providers and set a large data allowance. Thus, the sponsored data
option is o¤ered only for  < :
Corollary 1 The network proposes a sponsored data option when the proportion of HB
content is not too large (i.e., when  < ) and excludes the LB content otherwise. There is
less exclusion when this option is proposed than when it is not (u < ). The threshold 
for exclusion is decreasing in bh and increasing in b`.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Ban on zero-rating o¤ers
Let us now consider the welfare consequences of banning zero-rating o¤ers. This could come
from a regulatory rule such as a strict interpretation of net neutrality. As there is always
exclusion of the LB content when  > ; we focus on the case in which the fraction of HB
content is not too large. We assume that the regulator seeks to maximize total welfare. In
the case of zero-rating, this welfare is
W  =  [u (q) + (bh   1) q] + (1  ) [u (q` ) + (b`   1) q` ] :
10This bears some similarities with the analysis of capacity choices by Choi and Kim (2010). In their
paper, as in ours, the network reduces the value of the basic services to the website to raise the price of the
premium service.
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Since under zero-rating, the consumption of HB; qh = q; is e¢ cient, the main objective
of regulation is to increase consumption of LB content while avoiding any decrease in the
consumption of HB content.
We have shown in Section 3 that there will be more exclusion without zero rating because
the network cannot accommodate the LB content and simultaneously exploit its market
power on the HB content. Clearly, regulation is not desirable if it leads to exclusion. When
there is no exclusion, a ban on zero-rating induces the network to raise the level of LB
consumption (to qFB` ) and to reduce the level of HB consumption (from q to q
FB
` ). Thus, the
overall e¤ect of a ban is ambiguous.
When there is no exclusion, social welfare under the ban is given by
W u = u
 
qFB`

+  (bh   1) qFB` + (1  ) (b`   1) qFB` ;
which we compare with W  dened above.
Proposition 3 If zero-rating is banned, then
 when  >  > u; total welfare decreases;
 when  < u, total welfare decreases if  is small enough and increases if b` is close
enough to 1 (i.e., b` close to the cost of tra¢ c).
Proof. See Appendix
When  >  > u, allowing zero-rating benets both groups of content providers. The
LB content providers are now active, whereas they were excluded before. The HB content
providers also benet from the introduction of the sponsored data option because, to preserve
incentive compatibility, the network must leave them some rent  which is not the case when
uniform tari¤ is exclusionary.
When  < u, there is no exclusion under either regime. The e¤ect of a ban on zero-
rating is then more ambiguous because on the one hand the consumption of HB content is
too low but the consumption of LB content is e¢ cient. For  is small, the distortion of q` (or,
equivalently, of T ) under zero-rating is likewise small, so the former e¤ect dominated and
the ban decreases social welfare. However, when b` is close to 1 (for given ), the distortion
of qh under uniform tari¤ is small, so that the latter e¤ect dominates and the ban can be
benecial.
In short, the introduction of zero-rating changes the consumption for both types of con-
tent. When the price s = b` under uniform tari¤ is high, it reduces signicantly the consump-
tion of LB content with little e¤ect on the consumption of HB content, and thus decreases
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social welfare. When the price s is not a¤ected too much ( small), the main impact of
zero-rating is to increases the consumption of HB content to allow the network to decrease
the rent of the HB content providers, and this is socially protable.
In addition, one could consider an alternative regulation consisting in simply capping
the amount S that content providers must pay to benet from the sponsored data program.
By setting a cap, the regulator would limit the scope for distorting the LB consumption,
which is good for welfare. But this may also deter the network from o¤ering zero-rating, at
the cost of either inducing a lower consumption of HB content or the exclusion of the LB
content. Therefore, one can advocate the implementation of a reasonable cap, lower than
the unregulated level, but not too tight, to make sure that zero-rating is still o¤ered.
4 Extensions
4.1 One-sided pricing
Even if our framework allows the networks to make both sides pay, the current situation is
more similar to one-sided pricing, with a zero price for content, so it is worth investigating
the implications of zero-rating in this setting. Note that the zero-price rule for content can
be seen as one of the possible interpretation of the net neutrality regulation (see, for example,
Economides and Täg (2012)). Because zero-rating relates to consumersdata allowance and
not directly to tra¢ c, there is no inconsistency in allowing it in the context of a zero price
being charged to content providers for tra¢ c. Therefore, the regulator may or may not allow
it.
Let us then assume that the price s is constrained to be equal to zero, implying in
particular that all content providers participate. In the absence of sponsored data program,
the consumption of any content is given by qu0 that maximizes the network value u (q
u
0 )  qu0 ,
and the data allowance is set accordingly at T = qu0 . This leads to
V u0 = u (q
u
0 )  qu0 with u0 (qu0 ) = 1:
In this situation, the network cannot tax any content and thus imposes a small consumption
to consumers.
Let us suppose now that zero-rating is allowed. This means that on top of choosing a
data allowance T along with a zero price (s = 0) for content providers, the network o¤ers
content providers the option of sponsoring consumption at a fee S. In this case, the networks
pricing program is the same as in Section 3 except that the constraint s  b` is replaced by
the new constraint s = 0: The reasoning of Proposition 2 applies with this new constraint,
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which leads to the following optimal strategy for the network:
u0 (q0`) = 1 +

1  bh; T

0 = (1  ) q0`; S0 = bh (q   q0`) if 1 +

1  bh < p;
and T 0 = (1  ) q0` = 0; S0 = bhq if 1 +

1  bh  p:
To induce the HB content providers to choose the sponsored-data option with a positive
price S rather than the free standard contract, it requires the network to distort the con-
sumption of the LB content even more than the case of two-sided pricing (q0` < q

` ). The
network value under zero-rating is then
V 0 =  (u (q) + (bh   1) q   bhq0`) + (1  ) (u (q0`)  q0`)
Because the network could o¤er a sponsored data option while maintaining the standard
data allowance, there is always a way for the network to design such an o¤er and increase
its prot. However, the welfare implications of allowing/banning zero-rating are shown to
be ambiguous.
Proposition 4 Under one-sided pricing, the network always proposes a sponsored data op-
tion if it is allowed. A ban on zero-rating reduces total welfare when  is large. When 
is small, the ban reduces welfare if b` is small but increases welfare if b` is close to 1 and
demand is elastic enough.
Proof. See Appendix
When a sponsored data option is proposed, the consumption of HB content is unchanged,
but the price of the data allowance is higher, and thus, the consumption of LB content is
reduced. The attractiveness of sponsored data for content providers is naturally reduced
when the network is not allowed to charge content providers for tra¢ c. Hence, the network
must reduce the non-sponsored consumption still further to maintain the sponsored data
options value. From a welfare perspective, zero-rating is better than uniform tari¤ when
 is large because there is e¢ cient consumption of the HB content. When  is small, the
situation is more complex since the LB content consumption is only marginally distorted with
zero-rating. However, the cost of this distortion depends on the benet of the LB content.
When this benet is low, the consumption distortion is not excessively value-destructive,
and the benet from e¢ cient consumption of the HB content dominates. When this benet
is high and demand is elastic enough, the low revenue due to reduced level of consumption
outweighs the benet from e¢ cient consumption of HB content. Thus, the results obtained
under two-sided pricing extend to the case of one-sided pricing.
15
4.2 Elastic participation and competition between networks
In the main analysis, we considered the case of a monopoly network with inelastic sub-
scription demand. We now show that introducing demand elasticity or competition at the
network level does not a¤ect the main conclusions of our work. For this purpose, let us
describe in greater detail the participation decision of the consumers.
We consider a model with an initial unit mass of consumers, a unit mass of content
providers and I  1 networks (indexed by i). Content providers are further divided into a
mass  of type h and a complementary mass 1    of type `. The utility of each consumer
subscribing to network i and choosing a consumption prole fqih; qi`g and data allowance Ti
at a subscription fee Pi is given by11
u(qih) + (1  )u (qi`)  Pi + ~"i
where the idiosyncratic shock ~"i is a random variable that represents consumershetero-
geneity with respect to the intrinsic taste for network i. We impose no restrictions on the
distribution of preference shocks, but we implicitly assume that they do not convey any
information about the utility derived from consuming content.12
The timing of the game is unchanged, and we assume that in stage 1 each network
i simultaneously makes an o¤er (Ti; Pi; si; Si). In this slightly modied setting, content
providers may deliver their content to all networks  they then pay only a variable price
 whereas consumers subscribe to a single network. Moreover, we assumed that when
zero-rating occurs, the o¤er is a fee Si per consumer (or per mass 1 of consumers) on the
network.
Let Ni denote the mass of consumers subscribing to network i; and qi be the consumption
of each content under the data allowance. Each content provider takes Ni and qi as given
and chooses whether to pay SiNi to boost each consumer consumption to q or not. Hence,
the prot of each content provider using this network is given by
Nimax f(bt   si)qi; (bt   si) q   Sig :
In this context, the participation of content providers in network i and their choice of tari¤s,
as well as individual-level consumption for a given contract, are the same as before. What
di¤ers is that consumers can now choose among networks.
To unify notation between the case of uniform tari¤and the case of zero-rating, we denote
11If type-t content is not available on the network, we set qit = 0:
12This modeling of competition can be seen as a simplied version of the nested discrete choice" model
of demand developed in Anderson and de Palma (1992).
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by qit the individual consumption of type-t content on network i and by tit the per-consumer
payment of a type-t content provider to network i. Hence, we have
qit = T ; tit = siT under uniform tari¤ and no exclusion
qih = T=; qil = 0; tih = siT=; ti` = 0 under uniform tari¤ and exclusion
qih = q; qi` = T=(1  ); tih = siq + Si; ti` = siT=(1  ) under zero-rating
The gross consumer surplus is given by
CSi = u (qih) + (1  )u (qi`) :
A given consumer joining network i gains CSi+ "i Pi. Because there are several networks,
the mass of consumers subscribing to network i is given by
Ni = Pr

CSi   Pi + "i  maxf0;max
j 6=i
CSj   Pj + "jg

:
where the probability Pr is related to the random variable representing consumershetero-
geneity.
The total prot of network i is then
Ni [Pi +  (tih   qih) + (1  ) (ti`   qi`)] :
For any given strategy of the other networks (denoted z i), let
i (R; z i) = Pr

R  maxf0;max
j 6=i
CSj   Pj + "jg   "i

:
Now, we can write the prot of network i as
i (CSi   Pi; z i) [Pi +  (tih   qih) + (1  ) (ti`   qi`)] :
Under this formulation, it is easy to see that the networks best pricing strategy always
maximizes the network value per consumer.
Proposition 5 In any equilibrium of the game with elastic subscription demand and I
networks, each network chooses a tari¤ structure that maximizes its value per consumer:
Vi =  (u (qih) + tih   qih) + (1  ) (u (qi`) + ti`   qi`) : Hence, the optimal data allowance
T and tari¤ structure (s; S) is not a¤ected by demand elasticity or competition, only the
hook-up fee P is.
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Proof. Let Ri = CSi   Pi be the expected net consumer surplus and Vi be the network
value dened above. The networks prot can be written as
i (Ri; z i) [Vi  Ri]:
Note that Vi is independent of the subscription fee Pi and of the other networks strate-
gies z i: Indeed, Vi depends solely on T and (s; S) through their e¤ect on quantities and
revenue per user from content providers. Let us x the participation i (Ri; z i) by adjust-
ing Pi to maintain Ri constant. Then, prot maximization for a given Ri implies that the
network will always choose (Ti; si; Si) to maximize Vi.
The value Vi is solely dependent on usage, meaning that there is a natural ordering
in the pricing strategy. First, the network maximizes the value that can be shared with
consumers by setting adequate data allowance and usage prices. Then, the network decides
how much surplus to keep and how much to leave to consumers. Whereas the surplus Ri left
to consumers (and hence the subscription fee Pi) depends on the elasticity of demand and
on competition between networks, the data allowance Ti and the prices (si; Si) do not. It
follows that the allocation derived in the main model with a monopoly network is also the
equilibrium allocation in the case of many networks competing for consumers.
As far as welfare is concerned, if total demand is xed (inelastic consumer participation),
then introducing competition at the network level does not alter our results. However, when
aggregate demand is elastic, competition may increase total participation in the market.
We observe that, compared with the case of inelastic demand, regulation should be more
favorable to zero-rating under competition.
Corollary 2 Zero-rating is all the more welfare-enhancing compared with uniform tari¤ as
aggregate demand becomes more elastic.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3 Heterogenous cost and demand
We can introduce other dimensions of heterogeneity by allowing the content providers to
di¤er in their cost to the network  (normalized up to now to 1) and in the demand for their
product. Suppose that, per unit of consumption, content of type h generates a tra¢ c h and
a benet ah; while content of type ` generates a tra¢ c cost ` and a benet a`. We still
rank these two types of content providers according to their respective ratios of advertising
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revenue to cost and continue to assume that
b` =
a`
`
< 1 < bh =
ah
h
; 13
where bt is the benet per unit of tra¢ c.
We also allow the demands to di¤er across content types by assuming that the utility
derived from the consumption Q of type-t content is ut (Q) = tu (Q=t), with t > 0.
Although this is not essential to the argument, we assume at last that the utility function
u is quadratic and thus that the demand function D is linear. Thus, the demand function
for a price p  p of type-t content is Qt = tD (p). Therefore, t is a direct measure of
demand intensity of type-t content. To limit the number of cases to study, we also assume
that hh > ``. This means that the HB contents also generate high costs for the network
either because the demand is high or because the load is high.
The analysis under uniform tari¤ is then the same as before, adjusting for the new
demand. In particular, the network must choose between two prices for the content providers,
s = b` or s = bh:
We rst consider the case where s = b`. The consumer allocates then his data allowance
T across the two contents. He thus solves
maxhu

Qh
h

+ (1  )`u

Q`
`

s:t:hQh + (1  )`Q`  T
Let us denote by r the Lagrange multiplier of the data allowance constraint. This multiplier
is the shadow cost of tra¢ c faced by consumers and consumption levels are given by14
Qt = tD (rt)
where r solves
hhD (rh) + (1  ) ``D (r`) = T:15
The value captured by the network is then
V` =  (hu (Qh=h) + (b`   1) hQh) + (1  ) (`u (Q`=`) + (b`   1) `Q`) :
13The model is also compatible with a uniform benet a` = ah per unit of consumption across types and
di¤erent costs associated with consumption, in which case type h is low-cost content.
14The consumer maximizes hu

Qh
h

+ (1  ) `u

Q`
`

+ r (T   hQh   (1  ) `Q`).
15Notice that there is a one-to-one relationship between the data allowance and the shadow value of tra¢ c.
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Using Qt = tD (rt), the data allowance maximizing the network value will be chosen such
that
@V`
@r
= (r + b`   1)

h
2
hD
0 (rh) + (1  ) `2`D0 (r`)
	
:
Thus the network chooses the data allowance T = ``D ((1  b`) `)+(1  ) hhD ((1  b`) h)
that induces the shadow cost r = 1  b`: We then obtain the network value
V u` = 

hu

Quh
h

+ (b`   1) hQuh

+ (1  )

`u

Qu`
`

+ (b`   1) `Qu`

where Qut = tD ((1  b`) t) :
We now consider the second casein which s = bh. Here, LB content is excluded and the
same reasoning shows that it is optimal for the network to induce the e¢ cient consumption
Qh = hq with T  Qh: The network value is
V uh =  (hu (q) + (bh   1) hhq)
In this case again, there is a critical value u such that exclusion occurs if  > u:
Consider now the introduction of a sponsored data option at price S with data allowance
T . Following the above reasoning, let us denote by r the shadow cost of tra¢ c under data
allowance, assuming that all HB content providers and only them choose to the sponsored
data option. This means that the constraint to which this shadow cost is associated is now
((1   )``D(r`)  T . As each content provider is innitesimal, his individual choice
doesnt a¤ect the shadow cost r: Therefore, a type-t content provider concerned by the data
allowance would face demand Qt = tD (rt) : As the zero-rated consumption is tq; this
implies that type-h content providers opt for sponsored data if
(bh   s) hhq   S  (bh   s) hhD (rh) ;
while type-` content providers dont opt for it if
(b`   s) ``q   S  (b`   s) ``D (r`) = (b`   s)
T
1  :
Given these constraints and the participation constraint s  b`; it is easy to see that
a network targeting HB content providers with the sponsored data option sets s = b` and
S = (bh   b`) hh (q  D (rh)) :
From the networks perspective, the two main benets of sponsoring are that it enables
the extraction of more rent from content providers and can induce more e¢ cient levels of
20
consumption. This interaction between screening on one side and incentives on the other
side is a distinguishing feature of zero-rating in this extended setting. The optimal sponsored
data allowance tari¤ T is then obtained at the value that maximizes the new objective:
max
T;Qh;Q`


hu (q) + (b`   1)hhq + (bh   b`) h (hq  Qh)

+ (1  )

`u

Q`
`

+ (b`   1)`Q`

s:t: Qt = tD (rt) ; t = `; h; (1  ) `Q` = T:
The characterization of the solution can then be extended as described next.
Proposition 6 Suppose that content types di¤er in terms of costs, benets and demands.
If p > h (1  b`), there exists ^ < 1 such that the following hold:
a) For  < ^, the network o¤ers zero-rating to HB content providers with
s = b`; T  = (1  ) `D (r`) ; S = (bh   b`) hh (q  D (rh))
where r = 1  b` + 
1  (bh   b`)
h
`

h
`
2
:
b) If  > ^ and h > `, the network o¤ers zero-rating to HB content providers with
s = b`; T  = (1  )``D(p`=h) > 0 and S = bhhhq:
c) If  > ^ and `  h, there is exclusion of the LB content and a uniform tari¤ s = bh:
If p  h (1  b`), then T  = (1  )``D (` (1  b`)) and S = bhhhq.
Proof. See Appendix.
The new feature is that there is no exclusion if at equal consumption, the LB content
induces lower tra¢ c than the HB content. In this case, one can nd a (small) data allowance
that may deter consumption of HB content but not of LB content. Thus, the network need
not to foreclose the LB content to gain maximal prot from the HB content providers.
As before, exclusion may be achieved by way of a uniform tari¤ s = bh. When the
proportion of HB content is below ^ or when ` < h, the network accommodates the LB
content via sponsoring by HB content providers. The consumption of the LB content is
nevertheless sub-optimal.
A lesson from the result is that the distinction between a small benet and a large benet
(b` and bh) is the relevant one to determine which content provider will choose the sponsored
data option. What matters is thus the return on tra¢ c (the revenue for each unit of tra¢ c).
In particular, the size of demand a¤ects the prices (s; S) and the data allowance but not
which content providers will sponsor data.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that content types di¤er in terms of costs, benets and demands.
If zero-rating is banned, then
 when ^ >  > u or when  > ^ and h > `; total welfare decreases;
 when  < u, total welfare decreases if  is small enough and increases if bh is close
to 1.
Proof. see Appendix.
The welfare comparison is similar to the case in which only benets are heterogenous.
A new e¤ect is that zero-rating yields a further social benet in that it avoids complete
exclusion of the LB content when the proportion of HB content is large.
Similarly, a zero-price regulation reduces welfare if bh is high because in that case there
will be insu¢ cient (resp. excessive) consumption of the HB (resp. LB) content.
4.4 Paid content
4.4.1 Presentation
We now investigate the networks choice of tari¤s when content providers can charge positive
prices to consumers. For this, we assume that each content provider is a monopoly, but the
argument extends easily to the case of competition.
Whether a content provider charges a positive price or not will depend on the net benet
it obtains from consumers. Clearly, the price of content decreases with the net benet and
the content will be free for large benets. In order to discuss this issue in a tractable and
insightful way, we assume in this part that the low-benet type receives no benet, b` = 0:
Under this assumption, low-benet content providers always charge a positive price.
Let us consider a tari¤ (T; P; s) o¤ered by the network and accepted by the consumers.
A content provider of type t charges price pt for each piece of content, identical for all
content providers of the same type. Facing the tari¤ and these prices, a consumer chooses a
consumption pattern that maximizes
 (u (qh)  phqh) + (1  ) (u (q`)  p`q`)  P;
under the constraint
T  qh + (1  ) q`:
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This yields demands qt = D (pt + r), with t = `; h, where r is the Lagrange multiplier of the
data allowance constraint.
Since each content provider is innitesimal, it will take this demand as given and in
particular the shadow cost r: The prot of a content provider with benet b and price p
is then D (p+ r) (p  s+ b) : Let us dene pm (c) = argmaxp0D (p) (p  c) and qm (c) as
the monopoly price and quantity for a cost c and demand function D(p): We allow c to be
negative in which case the price pm (c) may be zero. We assume that the pass-through is
less than 1, that is p0m(c) = dpm=dc 2 (0; 1). Then, the contents price and consumption are
given by (
pt = max fpm (r + s  bt)  r; 0g
qt = min fqm (r + s  bt) ; D (r)g
: (5)
The low-benet (here zero-benet) content providers always choose a positive price pm (r + s) >
r: For the high-benet content providers, because p0m(r + s   bh) < 1; there exists a non-
decreasing cuto¤ value r^ (s) such that pm (r + s  bh) > r if and only if r < r^ (s) :16 In other
words, the high-benet content will be free of charge when the data allowance is tight. Notice
that r^ (s) = 0 if bh is large and s is small enough that pm (s  bh) = 0:
When the data allowance constraint is binding, the shadow cost r > 0 is the solution of
T = min fqm (r + s  bh) ; D (r)g+ (1  ) qm (r + s) : (6)
The content prices and consumption for a given binding data allowance T and price s are
then the solutions to equations (5) and (6). For a non-binding data allowance, we have r = 0
and T  qm (s  bh) + (1  ) qm (s) : Notice that choosing (T; s) is equivalent to choosing
(r; s) :
Let us now consider the tari¤s without zero-rating. As mentioned above, the network can
set the subscription fee P to extract the total consumer surplus, which leads to
P =  (u (qh)  phqh) + (1  ) (u (q`)  p`q`)
The network value is then
V u = max
s;r
 (u (qh)  phqh + (s  1) qh) + (1  ) (u (q`)  p`q` + (s  1) q`)
s.t. (5)
16Notice that 0  r^0 (s)   1
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Because @pt=@s < 1 and @qt=@s < 0; the slope
@V
@s
= 

qh

1  @ph
@s

+ (r + s  1) @qh
@s

+ (1  )

q`

1  @p`
@s

+ (r + s  1) @q`
@s

is positive for r+ s  1: Thus at the optimum, still denoted ru and su; we have ru + su > 1:
Moreover, it is optimal to set r  pm (r + s  bh) because on the range where pm (r + s  bh) <
r and r + s > 1; we have
V =  (u (qh) + (s  1) qh) + (1  ) (u (q`)  p`q` + (s  1) q`) ;
and, using the fact that qh = D (r) and q` = qm (r + s) ;
@V
@r

r+s=constant
= 
@
@qh
(u (qh)  u0 (qh) qh + (r + s  1) qh)D0 (r)
=  ( u00 (qh) qh + r + s  1)D0 (r) < 0:
We dene w = r + s as the total cost of consumption for consumers, and denote by
wu = ru + su. The above ndings show that wu is strictly larger than 1 and that content
providers charge their monopoly price:(
put = p
m (wu   bt)  ru;
qt = q
m (wu   bt) :
We now contrast two cases. In the rst one all content is paid while in the second only the
low-benet content is paid whereas the high-benet content is free.
4.4.2 All paid content
Suppose that bh is small enough that the high-benet content is a paid content at the optimal
tari¤s. This implies that w = r + s is a function ! (T ) of T only, independent of s (as long
as the data allowance is binding, i.e. s < ! (T )); solution of
T = qm (! (T )  bh) + (1  ) qm (! (T )) :
The network value is then
V u = max
w
 (u (qh)  pm (w   bh) qh + (w   1) qh) + (1  ) (u (q`)  pm (w) q` + (w   1) q`)
s.t. qt = qm (w   bt) ; t = h; `:
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Given a solution wu; the corresponding data consumption is the solution T u of wu =
! (T u) : As the network value V depends only on data consumption T u and not on r and
s; the optimal allocation may be implemented in various ways. The network may impose
T = T u along with s = 0; in which case content providers do not pay and data consumption
is constrained, or it may charge s = wu with no constraint on data consumption T > T u:
Suppose that the network decides to introduce zero-rating and screens the types. Let
(T; s; S) be the o¤er and r the new shadow cost of the data allowance.
Then, a content provider prefers to pay S to sponsor data if maxpD (p+ r) (p  s+ bt)
is smaller than maxpD (p) (p  s+ bt)  S; that is ifZ r
0
qm (s+ x  bt) dx  S:
It is then immediate that the high-benet content has the largest benet to take the option.
If the network screens the high-benet content provider with sponsored data, the network
value is then
V = 
 
u (qh)  pm (s  bh) qh + S + (s  1) qh

+ (1  )  u (q`)  pm (w   b`) q` + (w   1) q`;
qh = q
m (s  bh) ; q` = qm (w) ; S =
Z r
0
qm (s+ x  bh) dx:
The network o¤ers zero-rating with S > 0 if and only if r > 0. In other words, zero-
rating requires that the data allowance constrains consumption. Moreover setting r = 0 and
s = wu would implement the value maximizing allocation with uniform prices. Starting from
a situation where r = 0 and s = wu; we have
@V
@r

r+s=wu
=   ( qh + (wu   1)D0 (pm (wu   bh))) p0m (wu   bh) > 0:
Thus, when all content is paid, the ISP always chooses zero-rating and therefore to
constrain consumption (r > 0).
4.4.3 Free and paid content
We now consider the case where r^ (s) = 0 for all relevant prices s; which ensures that the
high-benet content is free.
We rst look at the uniform tari¤ such that each rm must pay s for any unit of load.
From the above analysis we know that if the network optimal strategy leads the high-benet
content to be free, then the network doesnt restrict the data consumption (ru = 0). We
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have also established that the optimal price su is larger than 1. More precisely it is given by
the solution of
q + (1  ) f[1  p0m (su)]qm(su) + (su   1)p0m (su)D0 (pm (su))g = 0
Notice that it must be the case that bh > su: Otherwise the high-benet content would
choose to be paid. This case then requires that bh > 1:
Consider now the case where the network uses the sponsored data option to screen content
providers. For given shadow cost r , the paid content provider is willing to sponsor data ifZ r
0
qm (s+ x) dx  S:
while the free content provider is willing to sponsor data if
(bh   s) (q  D (r))  S
Recall that by assumption r^ (s) = 0 so it must be the case that (bh   s)D0 (x)+D (x)  0
for x  r. This implies that
(bh   s) (q  D (r)) =  
Z r
0
(bh   s)D0 (x) >
Z r
0
D (x) dx >
Z r
0
qm (s+ x) dx:
Hence, as in the case of paid content, the high-benet content providers choose to sponsor
data. The program then writes as
V = max
r;s
 (u(q) + (bh   1)q   (bh   s)D(r)) + (1  )Vp(r + s)
where Vp(w) = u(qm(w))  pm(w)qm(w)) + (w   1)qm(w)
so the optimality condition for the price s; still denoted s; is:
@V
@s
= 0, (1  ) @Vp
@w
+ D(r) = 0; (7)
while the optimality condition for the data allowance (captured by the shadow value r) is
@V
@r
= (1  ) @Vp
@w
  (bh   s)D0(r) = 0 (8)
Thus, the optimal r, denoted r; is now positive. Moreover, as D (r) < q; the total cost of
consumption under data allowance is such that 1 < s + r < su.
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Indeed, sponsored data allows the network to reduce the deviation prot of the h-type
content providers by restricting the data allowance and adjusting s to preserve the total cost
r + s of consumption of paid content. As a consequence, the network raises consumption of
paid content while still imposing a data constraint so as to generate a shadow cost solution
of
@V
@r
= 0 )  D(r)  (bh   s)D0(r) = 0
) bh   s =  D(r
)
D0(r)
:
Therefore, the network still proposes a sponsored data program in this case. This results
in the same consumption of free content and a higher consumption of paid content, hence
more e¢ ciency. Moreover the paid content producers obtain a larger prot than with uniform
price. The implication for the prot of the free content providers is ambiguous as they face
a reduced price s but they have to pay the fee S to obtain the level of consumption q.17
5 Conclusions
We have shown how ISP can rely on zero-rating to screen contents with high willingness to
pay for tra¢ c. In terms of allocative e¢ ciency, this allows to direct more tra¢ c toward more
valuable contents. This is particularly relevant when content is free as market prices do not
allocate consumption according to values.
Due to the two-sided nature of the activity and monetization on the consumer side of the
market, the ISP internalizes the consumer surplus in its decision. Thus, potential negative
impact of discrimination on the content side, if any, must be balanced with welfare benets
on the consumer side. The extent to which this ultimately benets consumers depends on
the demand elasticity for a monopoly and on the intensity of competition between bottleneck
ISPs competing for consumers.
In this paper we have focused on a particular form of zero-rating, sponsored data paid by
content content providers. There are other forms of zero-rating plans that would be worth
considering. Zero-rating plans that are voluntarily o¤ered by the network can be analyzed
as a form of marketing and product design, with the drawback that they may raise some
competitive issues on the content side and congestion issues.
Even if our understanding of the networks cost in this paper includes the management
of congestion, it may be interesting to consider congestion issues more directly. To get
17Their prot is (bh   su)q without zero-rating and (bh   s)D (r) with.
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an idea about the potential e¤ect, we can suppose that consumers su¤er from a disutility
due to congestion. As the ISP internalizes the e¤ects on consumer surplus it will account
for the negative e¤ect of congestion and reduce data allowance accordingly, and as if the
ISP was bearing the cost of this congestion directly. The analysis of uniform tari¤ is then
similar to the analysis in Section 3.1, provided that the marginal e¤ect of congestion on
consumersutility is not too large. In general, introducing a sponsored data option results
in higher levels of tra¢ c. Due to increasing congestion, the program becomes less attractive
for the ISP (which cannot control tra¢ c under zero-rating). Adjusting to this lower benet
from zero-rating and lower rate of adoption, the welfare analysis would remain qualitatively
similar.
To conclude, this paper did not address anti-trust issues that zero-rating may raise if
some large content providers compete with smaller content providers. In this case, there is a
risk that ISPs favor some content providers over others, by setting tari¤s that are attractive
only to large content providers. This may provide a motive for capping the price that may be
charged for sponsoring data to reduce barriers to entry. Another related issue that should be
explored concerns vertical integration by ISPs in the content market. ISPs may be tempted
to exempt consumers from data restrictions when they consume their own integrated content,
thereby placing non-integrated content at a disadvantage. This is clearly an alley of research
for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
While V u` does not depend on , V
u
h is linear and strictly increasing in : At  = 0 ,
we have V u` > V
u
h = 0 (because q` is positive when s = s` < 1), whereas at  = 1, we have
V u` < V
u
h (because b` < bh). This implies that V
u
` < V
u
h for  above a threshold 
u with
0 < u < 1.
We dene the surplus U (p) = maxq0 u (q)  pq: The threshold u solves
u =
U (1  b`)
U (0) + (bh   1) q
which is decreasing in bh and increasing in b`: 
Proof of Corollary 1
The rst and last claims are immediate from Proposition 2 and equation (4). Let us
focus on the second claim, that is,  > u:
By the convexity of U(:) and U (p) = 0,
U (1  b`) < U (0) p  (1  b`)
p
hence
u <
U (0)
U (0) + (bh   1)D (0)
p  (1  b`)
p
Using U (0) < pD (0) (from convexity of U), we have
u <
pD (0)
pD (0) + (bh   1)D (0)
p  (1  b`)
p
=
p  (1  b`)
p+ (bh   1) = 
:

Proof of Proposition 3
If  >  > u, it is immediate that zero rating is better than uniform tari¤, as the
consumption level of HB content is the same, and there is no consumption of LB content
under uniform tari¤.
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We focus now on the case in which  < u. Under zero rating, expected social welfare is
given by
W   W u =  u (q) + (bh   1) q   u  qFB`   (bh   1) qFB` 
  (1  ) u  qFB` + (b`   1) qFB`   u (q` )  (b`   1) q`  :
At  = 0, we have W  = W u and q` = q
FB
` : Using the rst-order conditions above we
have the following:
@(W   W u)
@
j=0= u (q) + (bh   1) q   [u (qu` ) + (bh   1)qu` ] > 0:
Therefore, at least for small values of , sponsored pricing dominates uniform tari¤.
Suppose nally that b` is close to 1; then, qFB` is close to q, while q

` < q
FB
` : Hence,
W   W u < 0: .
Proof of Proposition 4
The rst part follows from the fact that the prot under zero-rating is larger than the
prot with a sponsored data option at price S = bh(q   qu0 ) and T = (1  ) qu0 < q; since
 [u (q) + (bh   1) q   bhqu0 ] + (1  ) [u (qu0 )  qu0 ] > u (qu0 )  qu0 : (9)
As far as the welfare e¤ects are concerned, the di¤erential between the welfare under
sponsored pricing and strict zero-price regulation is given by
 =  [u (q) + (bh   1) q   u (qu0 )  (bh   1) qu0 ] (10)
  (1  ) [u (qu0 ) + (b`   1) qu0   u (q0`)  (b`   1) q0`] ;
where qFB` > q
u
0 = D (1) > q

0`: This is positive at  = 1, hence the second part of
the proposition. The last part is more intricate since the welfare di¤erential vanishes at
 = 0 because q0` converges to q
u
0 . Note rst that
@q0`
@
= D0(1 +

1  bh)
bh
(1  )2
The slope of the welfare di¤erential is
@
@
= [u (q) + (bh   1) q   (bh   b`) qu0 ] [u (q0`) + (b`   1) q0`]+(bh + (1  ) b`)D0
 
1+

1  bh
 bh
(1  )2
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Moreover,
@
@
j=0= [u (q) + (bh   1) q   u (qu0 )  (bh   1) qu0 ] + b`bhD0(1) (11)
with the rst term being positive and the second negative. The second term vanishes when
b` = 0 (while qu0 and q

0` are not a¤ected by b`), meaning that the slope is positive in this
case. Therefore, for  close to 0, sponsored pricing dominates zero-price when the benet of
LB rms is small.
Note also that by concavity,
[u (q) + (bh   1) q   u (qu0 )  (bh   1) qu0 ] < bh (q   qu0 ) :
Hence, the slope @
@
j=0 is negative if
q   qu0
qu0
< b`

 D
0(1)
D (1)

;
therefore when demand is elastic and the LB content benet is large. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Consider a monopoly network with elastic demand  (CS  P ) : Let V  and W  be the
network value and welfare per consumer with zero-rating. Let V and W be the network value
with uniform tari¤.
With network value V; the network chooses the fee P by solving
max
F
 (R) (V  R)
R = CS  P
The rst-order condition for P then yields
R +
 (R)
0 (R)
= V
which denes R as an increasing function of V: Thus, with elastic participation, the con-
sumersparticipation  (R) is a function N (V ) ; increasing with V:
Hence participation N with zero-rating is higher than participation N under a uniform
price. Whenever N= N > W=W ; allowing zero-rating dominates. Whether this occurs
depends on the elasticity of demand. Note that V ; W ; V and W are independent of ;
thus, the ratio N= N increases when demand becomes more elastic. Thus, allowing zero
rating will dominate for very elastic demand.
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Under competition the same reasoning holds but  has to be interpreted as the equilibrium
residual demand faced by the network. 
Proof of Proposition 6
We proceed in three steps. First, we derive the optimal contract when the h-type provider
chooses the sponsored option. Then, we show that it is not possible to make the `-type
provider (and only this type) choose the sponsored option. Finally, we show that it is
protable to use this contract rather than to propose the sponsored option for all types of
content providers.
The optimal contract when the h-type provider chooses the sponsored option can be
written as
V  = max
T;r
 
h [u (q) + (bh   1)hq   (bh   b`) hD (rh)]
+ (1  ) ` [u (D (r`)) + (b`   1)`D (r`)]
!
(12)
s:t: (1  ) ``D (r`) = T
In the case of a linear demand function, we have D(p) = qmax(1  p=p; 0). Notice that
the positivity constraint on T imposes that 0  r  p=`.
First notice that if p  h (1  b`), then the network can implement and capture the rst-
best total surplus by setting T = (1  )``D (` (1  b`)) ; s = b` and S = bhhhq. Indeed
faced with this data allowance, a consumer who has the choice between LB and HB contents
would consume only LB content, as u0 (D (` (1  b`))) = ` (1  b`)  `hu0 (0) =
`
h
p: Hence,
the only possibility for an HB content provider to have a positive demand is to buy the
sponsored data option.
We now focus on the case where p > h (1  b`).
Case 1: h  `.
If r < p=`, the slope of the objective V is
h (bh   b`) 2h
q
p
  (1  ) ` [r + b`   1] 2`
q
p
:
The solution of the program is
r = r^ ()  1  b` + 
1   (bh   b`)
h
2
h
`
2
`
as long as r^ ()  p=`, which occurs for   ^ where ^ is dened by r^

^

= p=`:
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For  > ^, there is exclusion of LB content with T  = 0 (or equivalently r = p=`) and
S = bhhhq.
Case 2: h > `.
In this case, if r < p=h, the slope of the objective V is still
h (bh   b`) 2h
q
p
  (1  ) ` [r + b`   1] 2`
q
p
:
If p=h < r  p=`, we have D(rh) = 0 and the slope of V is  (1   )`[r + b`  
1]2` q=p < 0, because p > h (1  b`) :
The solution of the program is still
r = r^ ()
as long as r^ ()  p=h, which occurs for   ^ where ^ now is dened by r^

^

= p=h:
For  > ^ the solution is r = p=h; with D(rh) = 0, S = bhhhq and T = (1  
)``D(p`=h) > 0.
Is there a reason why the ISP would want to induce the LB content providers (and only
those types) to choose the sponsored data option? This would means that the shadow value
r is linked to the constraint hhQh  T or equivalently that Qh = D(rh). In this case,
the ICs can be written as
(b`   s)``q   S  (b`   s)``D(r`)
(bh   s)hhD(rh)  (bh   s)hhq   S
We also have the participation constraints, with in particular the fact that s  b`. The ISPs
objective is then
Maxr;s  [hu(D(rh)) + (s  1)hhD(rh)]
+ (1  ) [`u(q) + (s  1)``q + (b`   s)``(q  D(r`))]
which can be transformed into
Maxr;s  [hu(D(rh)) + (s  1)hhD(rh)]
+ (1  ) [`u(q)  ``q + b```(q  D(r`)) + s``qD(r`)]
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This means that the objective is increasing is s. As s cannot exceed b`, we nd s = b` and
S = 0. But in this case, the incentive constraint of the HB content providers is violated, as
long as r > 0. So the two incentive constraints must be binding. Let us then write the ISPs
prot in this case.
 [hu(D(rh)) + (s  1)hhD(rh)]
+ (1  ) [`u(q) + (s  1)``q + (b`   s)``(q  D(r`))]
As the LB contents incentive constraint is binding, the ISP could ask this content to choose
the sponsored data option. The resulting value for the network would be
 [hu(q) + (s  1)hhq + (bh   s)hh[q  D(rh)]]
+ (1  ) [`u(q) + (s  1)``q + (b`   s)``(q  D(r`))]
Focusing on the prot generated by the HB contents, one can easily check that it is higher
the latter case than in the former. So any contract that would induce sponsoring only by
the LB is dominated for the ISP by an o¤er that induces the two types of content to choose
the sponsored data program.
Let us therefore look at the case where both types sponsor the tra¢ c, by paying a xed
amount S on top of the variable price s. With only one contract, there is no incentive
constraint to satisfy, only participation constraints which writes as
S  (bh   s)hhq and S  (b`   s)``q
Assuming that hh  ``, only the second participation constraint may be binding.
The ISPs program writes as
 [hu(q) + (s  1)hhq + S] + (1 + ) [`u(q) + (s  1)``q + S]
so S will chosen at its maximum. The ISPs program can then be written as
 [hu(q) + s(hh   ``)q + b```   hhq] + (1 + ) [`u(q) + (bh   1)``q]
The optimal solution is to set s = b` and therefore S = 0. But this is dominated by a
uniform tari¤ at s = b` and T = hhD (h (1  b`)) + (1  ) ``D (` (1  b`)) : So there
is no reason to propose a contract in which the sponsored option is proposed to everyone.

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Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is the same as the Proof of Proposition 3, adjusting for the new dimensions of
heterogeneity. The welfare di¤erential is
W   W u = h

u (q) + (bh   1) hq   u
 
qFB`
  (bh   1) hqFB` 
  (1  ) `

u
 
qFB`

+ (b`   1) `qFB`   u (q` )  (b`   1) `q`

:
The di¤erence arises when  > ^ and h > ` because there is no exclusion of LB content
with sponsored pricing while there is without. Therefore, it is optimal to allow zero rating.

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